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Alpha — Odal Node is in active development. APIs, schemas, and docs may and will change before 1.0.

Permanence & retention

ESPR makes a published passport a long-lived obligation, not a transient record. Once a product is on the market, Art. 9(2)(i) requires its passport to stay available for a period the delegated act sets, “at least the expected lifetime of a specific product” — ESPR itself fixes no number. And under Art. 10(4) the operator must make a back-up copy available through a “digital product passport service provider”, so the passport survives even if the operator does not.

A node is built so those guarantees hold by construction, not by good behaviour. Permanence is not a policy an operator opts into; it is a property of how the software works.

Retention has two directions that are easy to conflate, so state them plainly: the raw import files fed into a node are discarded after signing and never retained (see What Odal can and cannot see); the signed passport they produce is retained permanently and can never be deleted. This page is about the second direction — the permanence of a published passport.

The moment a passport is published, a retention lock is set on it — and it is never cleared. A locked passport can still change state: it can be suspended during a recall, or archived at end-of-life. But its content can no longer be edited. Only a draft is mutable; once a passport becomes a signed, published proof, it is fixed.

The node’s storage interface has no delete operation at all. This is a structural guarantee rather than a setting: a published passport cannot be removed, regardless of what the database underneath would technically allow, and regardless of who operates the node. The capability simply does not exist in the surface that talks to the data — and, as a second line of defence, the database itself rejects the change (see Operating a node securely).

Every transition — created, published, suspended, archived — is written to an audit trail as it happens. Entries are only ever added; they are never rewritten or deleted. A passport’s provenance can therefore be examined years later and trusted to reflect what actually occurred, in the order it occurred.

When a product reaches end-of-life, its passport moves to archived — read-only, but still resolvable. The regulation’s record-keeping window outlives the product itself, and archival keeps the passport readable for that entire window instead of removing it. End-of-life is a lifecycle state, never a deletion.

The QR code on a product encodes a resolver address that has to keep working for the full retention period — potentially long after the product was made. GS1 Digital Link and the EU Central Registry add a layer of indirection between the printed identifier and the passport’s current location: the registry maps a product’s identifier to wherever its passport lives, so an operator can move or re-home the resolver without reprinting a single label. The physical mark stays valid even as the infrastructure behind it changes.

Article 10(4)’s back-up copy — held by a digital product passport service provider, so a passport survives an operator’s insolvency or shutdown — is the operator’s obligation, and Art. 11(e) requires availability to continue through insolvency, liquidation or cessation of activity. The proof-bound model makes it tractable: what has to be preserved is the signed passport and its history, not a sprawling production dataset. How this meets the registry is described under EU Central Registry.